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The vegetative state
Martin M Monti,1 Steven Laureys,2 Adrian M Owen1
The vegetative state may develop suddenly (as a conse-
quence of traumatic or non-traumatic brain injury, such 
as hypoxia or anoxia; infection; or haemorrhage) or gradu-
ally (in the course of a neurodegenerative disorder, such 
as Alzheimer’s disease). Although uncommon, the condi-
tion is perplexing because there is an apparent dissocia-
tion between the two cardinal elements of consciousness: 
awareness and wakefulness.1 Patients in a vegetative state 
appear to be awake but lack any sign of awareness of them-
selves or their environment.w1 Large retrospective clinical 
audits have shown that as many as 40% of patients with a 
diagnosis of vegetative state may in fact retain some level 
of consciousness. Misdiagnosis has many implications for 
a patient’s care—such as day to day management, access 
to early interventions, and quality of life—and has ethical 
and legal ramifications pertaining to decisions on the dis-
continuation of life supporting therapies.2 w2-w4
Overall, our understanding of the vegetative state is 
incomplete. Although we know quite a lot about the neu-
ropathology underlying the vegetative state, our ability to 
assess (un)consciousness and cognitive function in the 
clinic is extremely limited, as highlighted by the high rate 
of misdiagnosis.
What is the vegetative state and what is it not?
The 2003 guidance from the UK’s Royal College of Physi-
cians on diagnosing and managing the permanent vegeta-
tive state defines it as “a clinical condition of unawareness 
of self and environment in which the patient breathes 
spontaneously, has a stable circulation, and shows cycles 
of eye closure and opening which may simulate sleep and 
waking.”3 Three main clinical features define the vegeta-
tive state: (a) cycles of eye opening and closing, giving the 
appearance of sleep-wake cycles (whether the presence of 
eye opening and closing cycles actually reflects the pres-
ence of circadian rhythms is unclearw5  w6); (b) complete 
lack of awareness of the self or the environment; and (c) 
complete or partial preservation of hypothalamic and 
brain stem autonomic functions.3  4 The guidelines from 
the Royal College of Physicians consider a vegetative state 
to be persistent when it lasts longer than a month and 
permanent when it lasts longer than six months for non-
traumatic brain injuries and one year for traumatic brain 
injuries.3 Guidelines published in the United States, how-
ever, consider that for non-traumatic brain injury a per-
manent vegetative state exists after only three months.4
Although both the persistent and the permanent veg-
etative states are often abbreviated to “PVS,” authors of 
a letter in the BMJ in 2000 suggested that to avoid con-
fusion the abbreviation should be used exclusively to 
indicate a permanent vegetative state.w7 The American 
Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine suggested that the 
cause of injury (traumatic, anoxic) as well as the time 
elapsed since onset of the condition should be docu-
mented, as both are important for prognosis.w8
Experts have suggested that the vegetative state should 
be seen as part of a continuous spectrum of conditions, 
often referred to as disorders of consciousness, in which 
someone’s wakefulness and/or awareness are impaired 
after severe brain injury (figure, table 1).5  6 This sugges-
tion is consistent with the idea that awareness and una-
wareness are part of a continuum, and it highlights the 
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importance of differentiating the vegetative state from 
other related neurological conditions that may also fol-
low catastrophic brain injury.
Coma 
Coma is a condition of unresponsiveness in which 
patients lie with their eyes closed, do not respond to 
attempts to arouse them, and show no evidence of aware-
ness of self or of their surroundings.7 Patients lack not 
only signs of awareness (similar to vegetative state) but 
also wakefulness (unlike vegetative state) regardless of 
how intensely they are stimulated. Patients typically 
either recover or progress to a vegetative state (that is, 
they show signs of wakefulness) within four weeks.3 Irre-
versible coma with absent brainstem reflexes indicates 
brain death, which is not the same as a vegetative state.8
Minimally conscious state
The minimally conscious state is a condition in which 
patients appear not only to be wakeful (like vegetative 
state patients) but also to exhibit inconsistent (fluctuat-
ing) but reproducible signs of awareness (unlike patients 
with vegetative state).9 Like the vegetative state, the 
minimally conscious state may be transitory and pre-
cede recovery of communicative function or may last 
in definitely.
Locked-in syndrome
Locked-in syndrome (or pseudocoma), although not a 
disorder of consciousness,  may be confused with veg-
etative state. Patients with locked-in syndrome are both 
awake and aware, yet they are entirely unable to produce 
any motor output or they have an extremely limited rep-
ertoire of behaviours (usually vertical eye movement or 
blinking).w10 w11
What causes the vegetative state?
In terms of neuropathology, the vegetative state is mostly 
marked by cortical or white matter and thalamic, rather 
than brain stem, injury. A review of the evidence avail-
able up until 1994 highlighted the fact that traumatic 
injury was found to be associated with diffuse damage to 
subcortical white matter (or diffuse axonal injury). Cases 
of non-traumatic injury, on the other hand, were found 
to have extensive necrosis in the cerebral cortex, almost 
always associated with thalamic damage.10
In a more recent survey of patients with brain injury 
(n=49), 35 (71%) patients had traumatic brain injury, of 
whom 25 (71%) had severe diffuse axonal injury and 7 
(20%) had major injury to the cerebral cortex.11 Among 
the 35 patients, the thalamus seemed to be abnormal in 
28 (80%) and damage to the brain stem was present in 
only 5 (14%). In the 14 (29%) patients with non-trau-
matic injury, 9 (64%) cases presented with diffuse  neo-
cortical damage; in all 14 cases a profound and diffuse 
neuronal loss was apparent in the thalamus and hippo-
campus. Overall, these lesions effectively render a struc-
turally intact cortex unable to function by destroying the 
connections between cortical areas via the thalamus, as 
well as afferent and efferent cerebral connections.
What affects prognosis in patients with a diagnosis of 
vegetative state?
Three major factors affect the prognosis of patients with 
vegetative state: time spent in the vegetative state, age, 
and type of brain injury. 
Time spent in the vegetative state
A study of 140 patients showed that time spent in a veg-
etative state is negatively correlated with the chances of 
recovering independence and consciousness and posi-
tively correlated with the probability of remaining in a 
vegetative state.12 The role of time in prognosis was con-
firmed by a large review of 603 adult published cases,13 
from which it was estimated that the chance of regaining 
independence at one year after injury steadily decreased 
with time from 18% (one month in the vegetative state), 
to 12% (three months), and 3% (six months). Similarly, 
the chance of recovering consciousness at one year also 
decreased, from 42% to 27% and 12% respectively. The 
chances of remaining in the vegetative state at one year 
after injury were estimated to increase from 19% to 35% 
and 57% respectively. 
Age
Younger patients show better recovery rates.13 In one 
report, for example, the rates of recovering independ-
ence at one year decreased from 21% for patients below 
20 years old to 9% for patients between 20 and 39 years 
old and 0% for patients above 40 years.12 
Table 1 | Consciousness and motor behaviour characteristics 
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Flow chart of cerebral insult and coma.  
Adapted from Laureys et al, 2004w9
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Type of brain injury
Traumatic brain injuries are associated with better out-
comes at one year than non-traumatic injuries, in terms 
of recovery of independence (24% v 4%) and recovery 
of consciousness (52% v 13%).3  4  13 Once permanent 
vegetative state is diagnosed, the chances of recovery are 
considered to be “extremely low,”4 with any further recov-
ery being “exceedingly rare, and almost always involving 
severe disability”13; and although cases of late recovery 
have been reported,w12-w14 a precise estimate of the likeli-
hood of further recovery remains difficult to formulate. 
This is mainly because these cases are often difficult to 
verify, and when a set of 30 cases claiming late recovery 
were reassessed by the Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 
evidence of conscious awareness could be detected in 
half of them well before the boundary for a diagnosis of 
permanent vegetative state.13  14
How is the vegetative state diagnosed?
No tool exists for quantifying the extent of conscious-
ness. Differentiating between awareness and non-
awareness ultimately relies on a pragmatic principle 
that someone is conscious if they can indicate so. Cur-
rently, the diagnosis of the vegetative state is based on 
two main sources of information: a detailed clinical 
history and careful (but subjective) observation of the 
patient’s spontaneous and elicited behaviour. Clinical 
assessments involve repeated examinations at different 
times of the day because patients who are not in a vegeta-
tive state may have alternating periods of awareness and 
unawareness (and a single examination cannot exclude 
a state of minimal consciousnesses) as well as circadian 
oscillations in levels of wakefulness. Examinations aim 
to uncover evidence of (a) awareness of the self or the 
environment; (b) sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or 
voluntary response to visual, olfactory, auditory, tactile, 
or noxious stimuli; and (c) comprehension of language or 
expression. If evidence of these exists, the patient is con-
sidered to be (minimally) aware. If meaningful “object 
use” (such as appropriate use of a spoon or comb) or con-
sistent communication can also be established, then the 
patient is considered to have emerged from a minimally 
conscious state to a condition of severe disability (table 
2).9 However, if no evidence of awareness can be found, 
the patient is considered to be “not aware” and therefore 
in a vegetative state.
Although several protocols exist for conducting behav-
ioural assessments (articles by Giacino et al and  Majerus 
et al provide an overvieww15 w16), they differ greatly 
in their ability to detect consciousness because of the 
number of domains (such as arousal and vision) assessed 
and the thoroughness of the assessment. Indeed, a recent 
study of 60 patients compared on three assessment tech-
niques reported that the Glasgow coma scalew17 classified 
as vegetative several patients who showed signs of con-
sciousness according to other behavioural scales.15 The 
Full Outline of UnResponsiveness (FOUR)w18 reclassified 
13% of the supposedly vegetative patients as minimally 
conscious, and the coma recovery scale-revised (CRS-
R)w19 reclassified an additional 28% of the patients as 
minimally conscious. The main discrepancy between 
scales seems to relate to their different focus on oculomo-
tor behaviour, with the FOUR and CRS-R protocols testing 
a greater variety of visual behaviours. For example, in 
all the patients reclassified by the CRS-R protocol, visual 
fixation was the key behaviour indicating awareness.
Does misdiagnosis of the vegetative state occur?
According to accumulating evidence from retrospec-
tive clinical audits2  16 and comparisons of alternative 
be havioural assessment techniques,17  18 misdiagnosis 
of minimally conscious patients as being in a vegetative 
state is not uncommon. In particular, although some 
studies have reported relatively low rates of misdiagnosis 
(18% w20), most studies seem to converge, across time and 
geographical location, on an approximate rate in excess 
of 40% (37%,16 41%,18 43%,2 45%19). Errors in diagnosis 
may result from lack of skill or training in the assessment 
of patients with catastrophic brain injury, limited knowl-
edge of this relatively rare condition, and confusion in 
terminology.16  20 
Two main problems seem to underlie misdiagnosis. 
Firstly, behavioural assessments of awareness present 
many complexities. For example, patients with physical 
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•	NHS Choices (www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Vegetative-state/
Pages/Introduction.aspx)—NHS information about the 
vegetative state
•	Royal College of Physicians. The vegetative state: 




Vegetative_state)—Web based encyclopaedia that gives 
a comprehensive, peer reviewed, overview of definitions, 
diagnostic criteria, and recent research on vegetative 
state and related disorders of consciousness 
•	Headway (www.headway.org.uk/Core/DownloadDoc.
aspx?documentID=446)—Fact sheet on coma from the 
brain injury association Headway, a charity providing 
help and support to people affected by brain injury
Table 2 | Differential diagnosis in severe brain injury survivors
Condition Definition Main clinical characteristics
Coma Unarousable state of 
unresponsiveness
Absence of eye opening (even after intense stimulation)
No evidence of awareness of the self or environment 
Condition protracted for more than one hour
Vegetative state Wakefulness accompanied 
by the absence of any sign of 
awareness
Presence of eye opening and closing
Absence of any reproducible purposeful behaviour 
including (a) no evidence of non-response to sensory 
stimulation; (b) no evidence of awareness of the 




Wakefulness accompanied by 
inconsistent but reproducible 
signs of awareness
Presence of eye opening and closing
Presence of inconsistent but reproducible purposeful 
behaviour including (any of) (a) non-reflexive response 
to sensory stimulation; (b) awareness of the self or 
the environment; (c) language comprehension or 
expression
Lack of functional communication or object use
Locked-in syndrome Impairment in the production of 
voluntary motor behaviour
Presence of eye-coded communication
Preserved awareness
Complete or partial inability to produce motor 
behaviour
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disability may not be able to respond to stimulation—
something that was true in all misdiagnosed cases in a 
large retrospective study of 97 patients with profound 
brain damage.2 Sensory impairments (particularly in 
the visual domain) can also mask the presence of aware-
ness,16  20 a factor that has been reported as underlying 
as many as 65% of misdiagnoses.2 Other acquired condi-
tions, such as hydrocephaly,3 w21 can also mask the pres-
ence of awareness. In addition, patients in a minimally 
conscious state may display inconsistent behaviour, mak-
ing it difficult to interpret their responses, and they may 
be not aware for protracted intervals, making it difficult 
to interpret failure to respond.3
Secondly, there is a conceptual problem in the logic of 
establishing “lack of awareness”21  22: absence of evidence 
(of awareness) is taken as evidence of absence (of aware-
ness). Consequently, on the basis of the current clinical 
standards, patients who are aware but non-responsive 
cannot be distinguished from non-aware (vegetative) 
patients.23  24 Clinically, this flaw in logic introduces a 
category of aware but non-responsive patients for whom 
a diagnosis of vegetative state is technically appropriate 
(that is, they show no signs of awareness) but incorrect 
(in fact, they are aware).21  22
Is there a place for brain imaging as a diagnostic tool?
In recent years, techniques such as positron emission 
tomography, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and 
electroencephalography have been used to try to assess 
residual brain function and consciousness in vegetative 
patients without relying on motor behaviour. Neuroimag-
ing studies in patients in a vegetative state have shown 
a consistent reduction in brain metabolism of as much 
as 50%w22 and reduced basal resting state activity.25 In 
addition, unexpected levels of residual cognitive func-
tion (such as processing of linguistic and self referential 
stimuli) are present in both minimally conscious patients 
and patients in a vegetative state.26  27 In some of these 
cases, high level functions (such as learning and actively 
maintaining information through time) are present,28-30 
as are awareness23  24  28 and the ability to communicate 
solely by modulation of brain activity.23
The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS states, however, 
that “neurodiagnostic” tests, although recognised as 
“providing useful information when used in conjunc-
tion with clinical evaluation” are believed to be unable, 
alone, to “either confirm the diagnosis of vegetative state 
. . . or predict the potential for recovery of awareness.”4 
Although we agree that functional neuroimaging cannot 
confirm a diagnosis of vegetative state, it is increasingly 
clear that functional neuroimaging can be used to rule 
out a diagnosis of vegetative state and may even yield 
information about prognosis. Indeed, limited data on 
prognosis show that quantitative measurements of brain 
activity—in particular, activations beyond primary sen-
sory cortices—are positively correlated with recovery from 
the vegetative state.26  28 w23
Conclusion
Disorders of consciousness remain challenging to man-
age because of our superficial understanding of the phe-
nomenon of consciousness and its neural mechanisms. 
Two main strategies seem promising for reducing the 
consistently high misdiagnosis rate. Firstly, behavioural 
assessments need to be conducted more thoroughly and 
by trained staff (a neurologist or another healthcare pro-
fessional who has been trained to use the formalised 
assessments mentioned previously).2  16  18  20 Secondly, 
we believe that the inclusion of recommendations for the 
use of functional neuroimaging techniques in revised 
guidelines will increase the detection of covert signs of 
awareness in the very circumstances susceptible to mis-
diagnosis. In addition, these techniques can be used to 
explore the degree of mental life possible after severe 
brain injury,w24 thus tackling the medically and ethically 
important question “what is it like to be in a vegetative 
state?” In a minority of cases, these techniques may even 
allow the patients to interact with their environment and 
to some extent let their voice be heard.23
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What proportion of patients with supposed vegetative 
state can show a state of consciousness by using 
functional neuroimaging methods?
What proportion of behaviourally non-responsive patients 
can convey yes/no answers by wilful modulation of brain 
activity?
Do patients with disorders of consciousness have a 
“stream of thoughts”? Do they suffer? Do they understand 
their circumstance? What is their quality of life?
Can more sophisticated brain computer interfaces be used 
to allow these patients to interact with their environment 
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The ability of novel brain imaging technologies, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
to covertly detect signs of consciousness and residual cognition can contribute to correctly 
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